Supreme Court, U.S.
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No. 05-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JAMES MCCORMACK,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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Dated: October 17, 2005

BATEMAN & SLADE, INC. BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the imposition, prior to *United States v. Booker*, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), of a sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines that exceeded the maximum sentence supported by the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant may presumptively be corrected on review for plain error, or whether such an unconstitutional sentence is reversible plain error only in the rare case in which there is affirmative evidence, such as a statement by the trial court, that the court would have imposed a lighter sentence if not bound by the Guidelines.

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James McCormack petitions for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 371 F.3d 22 (App. 1a-9a). Following remand from this Court, the court of appeals again affirmed the defendant's sentence. That decision is unreported and appears at App. 10a-23a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 6, 2005. A timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on July 19, 2005. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The district court had jurisdiction under §18 U.S.C. § 3231, which grants exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States. The court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants jurisdiction to review all final decisions of the district courts, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), which permits a defendant to appeal a final sentence if it was imposed in violation of law.

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND GUIDELINES PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant constitutional, statutory, and Sentencing Guidelines provisions involved are set forth in the appendix to the petition. App., *infra*, 24a-29a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The underlying facts

On April 17, 1998, several men kidnapped James Carter, a "retired" drug dealer, took him to a warehouse in Charlestown, Massachusetts, and demanded that he liquidate some mutual funds in order to pay them a ransom. According to Carter, and cooperating witnesses, a firearm was brandished by one or more of the kidnapped. The government presented witnesses who testified that one of the kidnappers fired a bullet through the bumper of Carter's car when he resisted. Carter was released later that same day, and never paid the perpetrators any money.

2. The district court proceedings

In 2000, the government obtained a superseding indictment of the petitioner James McCormack. It alleged that McCormack conspired to violate and attempted to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 in connection with the kidnapping of Carter. In addition, the superseding indictment alleged that McCormack used and carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence – the Hobbs Act kidnapping. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

After a five day jury trial McCormack was convicted of conspiring to violate and attempt to violate the Hobbs Act. He was acquitted of the count charging use and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.

At sentencing, the district court determined that the base offense level was 18, and that enhancements should be added because of an express or implied threat of death (two levels), a ransom demand between $50,000 and $250,000 (two levels), the victim suffered bodily injury (two levels), and the victim was abducted (four levels). In addition, the court added a seven

level enhancement because a firearm was discharged. The defendant objected that the seven level enhancement was prohibited by this Court's earlier decision in *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), since he had been acquitted of that charge by the jury. The district court overruled the objection, calculated that the guideline sentencing range was 188 to 235 months, and imposed a sentence at the low end of the range – 188 months.

3. Proceedings on appeal

On appeal, in light of this Court's decisions in *United States v. Watts*, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), and *Harris v. United States*, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), the petitioner argued that the sentencing guidelines, as applied to the facts of the petitioner's case, were inconsistent with the statutory mandate in 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) that the Sentencing Commission was to issue guidelines "providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted disparity."

Petitioner based his argument on the perverse result that his sentence under the guidelines was 41 months longer because he was acquitted of the § 924(c) charge than if he had been convicted. The anomaly occurs because the petitioner would have received a sixty month sentence if he had been convicted of the 924(c) charge, but, since he was acquitted, the Sentencing Guidelines required the sentencing court to impose a seven level increase in petitioner's offense level under the Hobbs Act Guideline. That resulted in an increase of 101 months in the defendant's sentence (or 41 months more than if he had been convicted of the 924(c) offense). *See* U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.2 and 2K4.2. While conceding that petitioner's argument had "common-sense appeal, especially to anyone not familiar with the specialized world of the federal sentencing guidelines," the First Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner could not show that he was harmed.

4. Proceedings after remand

A timely petition for a writ of certiorari was filed. This Court granted the writ, vacated the judgment and remanded for consideration in light of *United States v. Booker*, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). On remand, the circuit court again affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding that under the applicable First Circuit caselaw, *United States v. Antonakopoulos*, 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005), the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the district court would have given him a lower sentence had it treated the guidelines as advisory, rather than madatory.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. There is a Clear Conflict Among the Circuits on the Proper Disposition of Plain Error Claims under *Booker*.

In the nine months since the Court decided *Booker*, the circuit courts have been thrown into conflict over the recurring question whether the imposition, under the pre-*Booker* mandatory Sentencing Guideline regime, of a term of imprisonment longer than the maximum sentence authorized under the Sentencing Guidelines by the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant constitutes plain error requiring a remand for re-sentencing. The focal point of the dispute has been the third prong of the traditional plain error test – *i.e.*, whether *Blakely/Booker* error is deemed to have affected the defendant's substantial rights. The First Circuit, as well as the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh, have adopted a rule under

which such errors will almost never result in re-sentencing.[1] The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that such errors will almost always result in re-sentencing.[2] And the D.C., Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that the district court in each case must determine whether re-sentencing is appropriate.[3]

While this doctrinal chaos may soon fade into distant memory as "pipeline" cases are disposed of, it exacts a terrible human toll on those defendants who have the misfortune to have been unconstitutionally sentenced in the First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits – a vast swath of the country. In addition, it results is startlingly disparate results among similarly situated defendants – based only on the happenstance of where they were prosecuted. The continued existence of this conflict promotes a pervasive, baseless disparity that this Court should remedy.

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[1] *United States v. Antonakopoulos*, 399 F.3d (1st Cir. 2005); *United States v. Mares*, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2005 WL 816208 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2005)(N0. 04-9517); *United States v. Pirani*, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir.)(*en banc*), *cert. denied*, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2005 WL1811058 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005)(No. 05-5547); *United States v. Lawrence*, 405 F.3d 888 (10th Cir.), *cert. denied*, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2005 WL 2494188 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2005)(No. 05-6306); *United States v. Rodriguez*, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (2005).

[2] *United States v. Davis*, 397 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir.), *en banc rev. denied*, 407 F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2005); *United States v. Hughes*, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Milan*, 398 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2005).

[3] *United States v. Coles*, 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005); *United States v. Crosby*, 397 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2005); *United States v. Paladino*, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Ameline*, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005)(*en banc*).

II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is Incorrect

This Court's review is also warranted because the court of appeals misapplied this Court's plain error precedents.

The court of appeals misapplied the standard this Court has defined for what constitutes an effect on "substantial rights." By holding that it must rule against a defendant unless he can affirmatively show that a lower sentence would have been more likely than a higher one, the court of appeals in effect misapplied this Court's holding in *United States v. Dominguez Benitez*, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004), which merely requires a showing that there is a "reasonable probability" of a different result. A defendant merely needs to show that the prospect of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

Here, the district court treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. In light of *Booker*, it is impossible to see how that decision might somehow not undermine confidence in the outcome. *Booker* requires judges to follow a vastly different process, in which the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer binding, and are merely one of several factors the judge must consider. Some of the factors that now must be considered were prohibited from consideration under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Trial judges were discouraged by the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines from considering other factors that now must be considered.

The court of appeals also erred in focusing dispositively on the question whether the defendant's sentence would have been different under a discretionary sentencing system. It suffices for a defendant to establish that his pre-*Booker* sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines would have been lower in the absence of unconstitutional judicial factfinding. The defendant need not also establish what might have happened if the sentencing judge had been given post-*Booker* style discretion.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

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October 17, 2005

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 02-2579

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JAMES McCORMACK,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Lipez, Circuit Judge, and
Garcia-Gregory,[1] District Judge.

ORDER OF COURT
Entered: June 6, 2005

This case has been remanded to us from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In United States v. McCormack, 371 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2004), we affirmed McCormack's conviction and sentence. We rejected his arguments that the district court erred in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal, and that the district court committed plain error in enhancing the defendant's sentence because a firearm was discharged during the commission of a felony, when he was acquitted of a

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[1] Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

charge of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence by the jury and his resultant sentence was potentially higher than what he could have received had he been convicted of the firearm charge. We note that Booker only affects the sentencing aspect of our earlier opinion.

McCormack was found guilty by a jury of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), based on his planning, orchestrating, and execution of a violent kidnapping and attempted robbery. After staking out the home of a man McCormack knew had made money selling marijuana in the 1980s, McCormack recruited several other men to kidnap the man and attempt to extort money from him. During the kidnapping, the victim was shot at, choked, had several teeth broken with the butt of a gun, poked with knives, and threatened with torture. The victim suffered a stroke in the ordeal which left him permanently disabled. Although acquitted of the charge of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, the evidence at trial showed that McCormack made available handguns -- one of which was fired -- to his fellow kidnapper. McCormack was sentenced to 188 months in prison.

After the Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded the case to us, we invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the case should be remanded to the district court under Booker for resentencing.

Having not preserved the claim of error, the burden is on McCormack to show a reasonable probability that the district court would have given him a lower sentence had it treated the Guidelines as advisory, rather than mandatory. See United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005). We stress it is his burden to show a reasonable likelihood, and mere hypotheses do not establish that burden. See

Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 80 ("As to the 'reasonable probability' test under the third prong, it is not met by the mere assertion that the court might have given the defendant a more favorable sentence.").

In attempting to meet that burden, he reiterates his sentencing-disparity argument, and also argues that factors such as his age and physical condition suffice to create such a reasonable probability. Each of these arguments was also made to the sentencing court, which considered them in deciding where in the Guidelines range to sentence McCormack. The record contains no indication that the district court felt itself constrained by the Guidelines, Heldeman, 402 F.3d at 222; and no circumstances creating a reasonable probability of a more lenient sentence, United States v. Figuereo, 404 F.3d 537, 541-42 (1st Cir. 2005). As his counsel acknowledged at sentencing, McCormack could have received a shorter sentence by pleading guilty, but instead elected to go to trial. Further, when provided the opportunity for allocution, McCormack expressed no remorse, instead opting only to complain about the conduct of an arresting officer. In his mid-50s when this crime was committed, McCormack was a seasoned criminal with an extensive criminal background. While the district court did sentence McCormack at the low end of the Guidelines range, over the government's request that he receive a mid-range sentence, that fact is not, by itself, sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence under an advisory Guidelines system. See Figuereo, 404 F.3d 537, at 541-42; United States v. Cacho-Bonilla, 404 F.3d 84, 95 (1st Cir. 2005).

McCormack has not carried his burden of showing a reasonable probability that he would have received a lower sentence if sentenced under an advisory Guidelines regime. Therefore, we direct entry of judgment affirming both the conviction and sentence.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the denial of a remand for resentencing. Although McCormack's claim of Booker error is unpreserved and subject only to plain error review (despite McCormack's claim of preserved error), McCormack has, in my view, shown "a reasonable probability that the district court would impose a different sentence more favorable to the defendant" under advisory Guidelines, United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2005), or, as we have also put it, a "reasonable indication that the district judge might well have reached a different result under advisory guidelines," United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2005).

Based on his primary role in the planning and execution of the violent abduction of a former drug dealer for ransom, McCormack was convicted by a jury of conspiring and attempting to obstruct commerce by robbery and extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). He was acquitted, however, of the charge that he used and carried a firearm during and in relation to that crime of violence, which, under the version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in effect at the time of the alleged offense in 1998, would have authorized a consecutive sentence of 60 months' (5 years') imprisonment "in addition to the punishment provided for [the underlying] crime of violence." McCormack was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 188 months, or 15 years and 8 months, at the bottom of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range of 188-235 months.

As we explained in United States v. McCormack, McCormack's primary challenge to his sentence was based on the argument

> that his sentence is longer than it would have been if the jury had convicted, rather than acquitted, him of the firearm charge. The reason, claims McCormack, is that the district court increased his base offense level by seven

> for his Hobbs Act offenses because a firearm was discharged in the course of the kidnapping. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3). [Given McCormack's Criminal History Category and the imposition of additional enhancements, the] applicable sentencing range [was] 188-235 months . . . . But if the jury had convicted him of the firearm charge pursuant to § 924(c), McCormack argues, then the Sentencing Guidelines would have directed the judge not to apply the firearm enhancement. See [U.S.S.G.] § 2K2.4 cmt. 4. Although [a] § 924(c) conviction would have added 60 months to his sentence, this would have resulted in a sentencing range of only 147-168 months, which, even if the judge imposed the maximum, is still 20 months shorter than the 188-month sentence he received.

371 F.3d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2004) (footnotes and citation omitted), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 992 (2005).

Under plain error review on direct appeal, we rejected McCormack's argument that his sentence "violates the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to 'provide certainty and fairness in sentencing and reduce unwarranted sentence disparities.'" Id. at 29 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(f)). We observed that the Guidelines themselves anticipated and offered a remedy for the sentencing disparity McCormack identified. The application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 provide that where a defendant convicted under § 924(c) would be subject to a "total maximum penalty that is less than the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction" under § 924(c),

> an upward departure may be warranted so that [a] conviction under . . . § 924(c) . . . does not result in a decrease in the total punishment. An

> upward departure . . . shall not exceed the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under . . . § 924(c).

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, cmt. n.4. Thus, if McCormack had been convicted of the firearm offense, the Guidelines would have authorized the district court to entertain, in its discretion, an upward departure from the statutorily mandated sentence up to the maximum Guidelines sentence of 235 months' imprisonment that McCormack faced after being acquitted of the firearm charge. We expressed "doubt[] that the mere potential for a disparity in sentences is enough to put the Guidelines and statute [28 U.S.C. § 994(f)] into conflict, especially given the application note" to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4. McCormack, 371 F.3d at 31.

However, McCormack's argument that his 188-month sentence was potentially 20-41 months longer than the 147-168 month sentence he would have faced if he had been convicted of the firearm charge cannot be dismissed as more of the same when offered as a factor in support of a Booker remand. Under an advisory Guidelines regime, the district court might well respond differently to the "common-sense appeal," McCormack, 371 F.3d at 25, of an argument that the Sentencing Guidelines, no longer mandatory, should not be used, in essence, to penalize a defendant for winning a jury acquittal for a charge of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. To be sure, a sentencing court remains bound after Booker to "consult th[e] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing." United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005). Even under the mandatory Guidelines, however, a court could decline to exercise its discretion, when sentencing a defendant convicted under § 924(c), to upwardly depart solely in order to match the higher sentence authorized by the Guidelines if the defendant had been acquitted but the court nevertheless found by a preponderance of the evidence

that a gun had been discharged during the underlying crime of violence. When the Guidelines became advisory, the availability of an upward departure to offset a potential sentencing disparity arising under the mandatory Guidelines became less of an answer to McCormack's claim that a portion of his sentence was unwarranted and need not have been imposed in the first place. Otherwise, if there were no difference in import, the Guidelines would remain, in effect, a mandatory sentencing regime.

In addition to his sentencing disparity argument, McCormack points to several mitigating factors, including his advanced age (61, at the time of his sentencing) and physical ailments (including the effects of a gunshot wound allegedly sustained when McCormack assisted a police officer who was being attacked by three men), that the court may consider and weigh in his favor on remand. The majority points out that McCormack presented these mitigating factors to the district court during sentencing, and that the court took those factors into account in its decision whether to sentence McCormack at the bottom, middle, or top of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range.

In discounting McCormack's mitigating factors for this reason, the majority ignores a salient point. McCormack presented those factors to the sentencing court not only to seek a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range, but also in support of a discretionary downward departure from that range. Under the mandatory Guidelines, however, the factors that McCormack raised were discouraged grounds for a downward departure. See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 236 (1st Cir. 1999) (physical condition generally a discouraged ground for downward departure); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 199, 202 (1st Cir. 1994) (age generally a discouraged ground for downward departure). Hence, these factors almost never garnered a defendant the relief of a sentence below the Guidelines range. Under an advisory

Guidelines system, with its greater sentencing flexibility, the court might well assign different weight to these same mitigating factors. Furthermore, although the position of a sentence within the Guidelines sentencing range is not by itself definitive in assessing the probability of a different outcome on remand, the fact that a court imposed the minimum sentence possible under the mandatory Guidelines at least increases the probability of an even more lenient sentence under advisory Guidelines.

In a number of cases where we have remanded for resentencing, courts expressly voiced their unhappiness with the Guidelines-mandated sentences they felt constrained to impose. While the majority notes that the district court in this case expressed no such dissatisfaction, we may not deny a remand for that reason without ignoring our caution that "[t]he existence of prejudice should not turn on how vocal the district judge was." Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 81. If a defendant has otherwise shown a reasonable probability of a lower sentence, a remand is warranted "[e]ven in cases where the judge was silent." Id.

A remand for resentencing does not in any way diminish the seriousness of the crime that prompted the original sentence. McCormack's violent crime requires a lengthy term of imprisonment. Yet that long sentence need not be the same sentence that McCormack received under the mandatory Guidelines. Long sentences serve the important purpose, among others, of protecting society from repeat offenses by removing the defendant from society and deterring further criminality when the defendant is released from prison. Under his present sentence, McCormack will be approximately 76 when he is released from prison. Arguably, under these circumstances, a somewhat lesser sentence would still serve the important protective purposes of a long sentence.

However, a remand for resentencing is neither "a suggestion [n]or a prediction that the sentence will necessarily be altered." Heldeman, 402 F.3d at 224. Rather, "it will be easy enough for the district judge on remand to say no with a minimum expenditure of effort if the sentence imposed under the pre-Booker guidelines regime is also the one that the judge would have imposed under the more relaxed post-Booker framework." Id. In this case, I would remand to give the district court the opportunity to make that determination.

By the Court:

Richard Cushing Donovan, Clerk

By: Margaret Carter,

Chief Deputy Clerk

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 02-2579

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JAMES McCORMACK,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Lipez, Circuit Judge, and
Garcia-Gregory,* District Judge.

Charles W. Rankin, with whom Rankin & Sultan was on brief, for appellant.

Kathleen A. Felton, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney, and George W. Vien and Michael D. Ricciuti, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on brief, for appellee.

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* Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

June 8, 2004

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This case raises two issues: whether this Hobbs Act prosecution was within the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, and whether the defendant's sentence was in error in light of his acquittal on one count.

Seeking to extort money from James Carter, a former drug dealer, James McCormack helped plan and execute Carter's kidnapping and ransom. After violently abducting Carter from his home, McCormack and his fellow kidnappers threatened to kill and torture him unless they were paid a million dollars. When Carter pleaded that he only possessed about $300,000 in mutual funds and other non-liquid assets, the kidnappers agreed to release him and told him to liquidate his mutual funds in small increments until he could pay them $100,000.

McCormack was eventually apprehended and convicted by a jury of both attempting and conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). He was acquitted of using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, id. § 924(c). He was sentenced to serve 188 months in prison.

McCormack argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the Hobbs Act convictions because no rational jury could have found that his actions would have at least a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. We reject this claim. In doing so, we do not adopt the government's test that a particular amount of money (here $100,000) is per se sufficient to meet the commerce element of a Hobbs Act offense. McCormack also argues that his sentence is plainly erroneous because it is longer than it would have been had the jury convicted, rather than acquitted, him of the firearm offense. This sentencing argument has a common-sense appeal, especially to anyone not familiar with the specialized world of

the federal sentencing guidelines. But in this case, McCormack cannot show plain error because he cannot bear his burden of demonstrating that he was harmed. Consequently, we affirm his 188-month sentence.

I.

The facts are described, for purposes of McCormack's sufficiency of the evidence challenge, as a reasonable jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 2004).

Sometime in 1997, James McCormack was approached by his friend and fellow Charlestown, Massachusetts resident, James Dagle, and asked about his willingness to participate in the possible robbery or kidnapping of James Carter. Dagle, a long-time criminal, explained to McCormack that he had learned from his attorney, Fred Ford, that Carter had accumulated large sums of money in the early 1980s from selling marijuana. Although Carter was eventually convicted and served eighteen months in prison in the late 1980s, he was fined only $15,000, and his assets were not forfeited. Dagle told McCormack that robbing or kidnapping Carter, who had recently moved back to the Boston area and was self-employed in the real estate business, could be potentially lucrative, and that Ford wanted to gauge McCormack's interest in participating in such a scheme.

McCormack, who independently knew that Carter had made a lot of money by selling drugs in the 1980s, told Dagle he was interested. Thereafter, Ford, Dagle and McCormack met several times to determine how they could find where Carter was living. Eventually, Ford learned that Carter was living with his family in Carlisle, Massachusetts. Ford[1] passed

[1]Attorney Ford was eventually convicted of attempting to hire an undercover agent to kill McCormack and Dagle because he feared that they would cooperate with authorities against him in connection with the Carter kidnapping.

this information to McCormack and Dagle, who arranged to obtain Carter's address from records in the Carlisle Town Hall.

McCormack and Dagle started watching Carter's house to see if there was an opportunity to break in while nobody was home. After ten or fifteen multiple-hour surveillance missions, the pair determined that Carter's house was rarely, if ever, empty. They told Ford that they did not believe that burglary of Carter's house was a feasible option, and Ford urged them to pursue the kidnapping plan.

In early 1998, McCormack organized a meeting with Dagle and two other acquaintances he had recruited, Phil Myers and Richard Hegarty, to discuss kidnapping Carter. McCormack proposed that the group wait outside of Carter's house and abduct him from his driveway immediately after he returned home from dropping off his two children at school. McCormack was familiar with Carter's schedule as a result of his surveillance activities. The group also discussed who would obtain the necessary equipment for conducting the kidnapping, and Dagle was put in charge of procuring several handguns.

Less than an hour after the meeting ended, Dagle met with McCormack and provided him with the promised guns, but told him that he no longer wanted to participate in the kidnapping. With the help of Myers, McCormack replaced Dagle with Dennis Quirk. The reconstituted group, which included McCormack, Myers, Hegarty, and Quirk, met several more times to finalize the details of the plan. On about April 10, 1998, Hegarty and Myers stole two cars and a van for use in the kidnapping, which was planned to take place a week later.

On the morning of April 17, 1998, the four conspirators met at a designated location in Somerville, Massachusetts. They were joined by a fifth person, Francis Lang, whom Hegarty and Quirk had recruited. McCormack put the guns that Dagle had supplied in the stolen car, along with handcuffs, gloves and hats. At least Quirk and Lang were given guns. McCormack,

accompanied by Myers, then drove the stolen van up to Carter's house and waited in a small bend part-way up Carter's long driveway. The other three drove the stolen car to the school that one of Carter's children attended. When they saw Carter returning from dropping off his child at the school, they radioed McCormack and Myers and then followed Carter home.

When Carter pulled into his driveway, his path forward was blocked by the van; once Carter stopped his car, he was boxed-in from behind by the car driven by Hegarty. Myers and Quirk, who were wearing stockings over their heads and vests that read "FBI," approached Carter's SUV, and Myers told Carter that he was under arrest. Carter attempted to escape by ramming his SUV into the van; in response, Quirk fired his gun into the front of Carter's vehicle. Myers then pulled Carter out of the window of the jeep using a choke hold and dragged him into the van, where he was handcuffed, blindfolded, and bound with duct tape. In the process, Lang, who had gotten into the van, hit Carter in the face with the butt of a gun and broke several of his front teeth.

McCormack, who was driving the van, sped off once Carter was inside. Followed by Quirk, who was driving Carter's SUV, and Hegarty, who was still in the stolen car, McCormack drove the van to Charlestown. During the drive, Myers and Quirk threatened to kill Carter unless he paid them a million dollars. Carter explained that he did not have that much money, but said that he did own about $300,000 in mutual funds.

After picking up Quirk, who had ditched Carter's SUV when it ran out of gas, McCormack drove the van to a warehouse in Charlestown. There, the kidnappers transferred the bound and blindfolded Carter into a laundry cart, which McCormack had arranged beforehand, and wheeled him inside the warehouse. The kidnappers took shifts interrogating Carter about how much money he had and where he kept it. Throughout, they hit Carter, poked him with knives, and

threatened to torture him and cut off parts of his body. Carter pleaded that while he was once a marijuana dealer, he no longer dealt drugs; he had invested most of the money he made while dealing drugs in real estate, mutual funds, and stocks.

Eventually, McCormack told Carter that he would be released so that he could sell his mutual funds and turn over $100,000 to the kidnappers. Carter was instructed to liquidate his mutual funds slowly, in increments under $10,000, and was told that somebody named "Sam" would call him with follow-up instructions. If he refused to pay the money or contacted the police, Carter was told that both he and his family would be killed. Keeping Carter bound and blindfolded, the kidnappers then removed his bloodied clothing, dressed him in new clothing, and dropped him off at the side of a road in Woburn, Massachusetts. Carter eventually found his way to a telephone and contacted his family.

The following day, after Carter spoke with his attorney, he reported the kidnapping to the Carlisle police. He also had extensive dental work done on his broken front teeth and learned that he had suffered a small stroke during the ordeal. As a result of the stroke, Carter suffers from several permanent disabilities: he slurs his speech, has a slight limp, and has problems maintaining his balance.

Several days after Carter reported the kidnapping to the police, his SUV, which had a bullet hole in its fender, was recovered. Carter also received several messages from "Sam" on his answering machine; the voice was McCormack's. But it was not until Myers was arrested in September of 1998 on an unrelated matter that the police learned who was behind Carter's abduction. Myers led officers to Dagle, who agreed to cooperate with authorities. Dagle recorded several conversations with McCormack in which the two discussed the Carter kidnapping and whether they would be caught by the police.

On December 21, 2000, a superseding indictment was filed in the District of Massachusetts that charged McCormack, inter alia, with conspiring and attempting to obstruct commerce by robbery and extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Hobbs Act), and with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, id. § 924(c).[2] After a five-day trial in which both Dagle and Myers testified and McCormack's incriminating recorded statements were presented to the jury, McCormack was convicted on the Hobbs Act counts, but acquitted of the firearm charge. On November 5, 2002, the district court sentenced McCormack to 188 months of imprisonment.

II.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Because McCormack moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 for a judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence, he has fully preserved his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Van Horn, 277 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2002). Our review is de novo. United States v. Cornier-Ortiz, 361 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2004). The issue is whether a rational factfinder, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter's kidnapping "in any way or degree obstruct[ed], delay[ed] or affect[ed] commerce," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). See United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003) (standard of review for denials of Rule 29 motions).

The commerce element of a § 1951(a) offense extends to the limit of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960); United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 335 (1st Cir. 2003). It reaches all

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[2]The indictment also charged McCormack with conspiracy and attempt to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. These counts were dismissed before trial and are not at issue here.

conduct that creates a "realistic probability of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce." Capozzi, 347 F.3d at 335 (quoting United States v. Butt, 955 F.3d 77, 80 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992)). Under this standard, it is the purpose of the conspiracy, rather than the result the conspirators achieve, that is relevant in determining the impact on commerce. United States v. Nguyen, 246 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 2001). Importantly, the de minimis test under the Hobbs Act remains applicable after the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See Capozzi, 347 F.3d at 335-36.

The government contends that the kidnappers' extortionate demand of $100,000, standing alone, is sufficient to satisfy the Hobbs Act's commerce element under the de minimis effects test. It argues that any reasonable factfinder would conclude that, in order to satisfy such an exorbitant demand, the victim would need to liquidate assets in a manner affecting interstate commerce.

We decline to adopt any bright-line rule that an extortionate demand of a certain sum from an individual can automatically satisfy the commerce element of the Hobbs Act. Determining whether an act has a reasonable probability of having a "de minimis effect" on interstate commerce inherently requires a multifaceted and case-specific inquiry. See United States v. Carcione, 272 F.3d 1297, 1301 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e have repeatedly held that in determining whether there is a minimal effect on commerce, each case must be decided on its own facts." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, it is far from clear that, as the government asserts, a $100,000 demand would necessarily require transactions affecting interstate commerce in every case: many people would simply have no way of gathering $100,000 together, whereas those specifically targeted because of their access to money may well be able to satisfy such a demand without resort to large financial transactions affecting interstate commerce. Finally,

the government's proposed standard does not adequately distinguish between the extortion or robbery of a business and that of an individual.

McCormack, ably represented, seizes on this last point to argue that the evidence is too attenuated here because the victim was an individual rather than a business or institution and was targeted because he was believed to have cash on hand. He correctly points out that the victim's connection to a business entity is an important, though not dispositive, consideration in determining whether the commerce element of a Hobbs Act violation can be met. Cf. United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2002) (there is a significant distinction between "the extortion of an individual and the extortion of a business for the purposes of establishing Hobbs Act jurisdiction"). Because criminal acts that are directed at individuals rather than at businesses normally have a less substantial effect on interstate commerce, courts have often required a heightened showing of an effect on commerce to sustain such Hobbs Act convictions. See id.; United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 238-40 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 1995).

The evidence here satisfies this heightened standard. A reasonable jury could have concluded that there was a "realistic probability" that the kidnapping would have a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Nguyen, 246 F.3d at 54. Here, the kidnappers specifically instructed Carter to liquidate $100,000 of his mutual funds after they learned that he could not meet a one million dollar demand. These funds, both parties agree, were managed by companies in interstate commerce and were themselves traded in interstate commerce; if Carter had sold them, as the kidnappers had demanded, both parties agree that "the sale would have reduced the value of the companies that managed the funds and the mutual funds themselves." Numerous courts have opined that the extortion

of an individual can satisfy the commerce element of the Hobbs Act when it "cause[s] or create[s] the likelihood that the individual will deplete the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce." United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Lynch, 282 F.3d at 1054-55; United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1085 (11th Cir. 2001). The kidnappers' demand did just that.

Further, the kidnappers told Carter to liquidate his mutual funds slowly, in increments under $10,000. A rational jury could have concluded that the purpose of this instruction was to evade federal regulatory oversight of large financial transactions. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 5313; 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (requiring many financial institutions to file currency reports when they participate in a transaction involving currency of more than $10,000). The jury could have concluded that the kidnappers' instruction to Carter directly undermined the federal regulation of substantial monetary transactions, and thus affected interstate commerce. This possibility, taken in conjunction with the instruction to liquidate appreciable sums from mutual funds that were traded in interstate commerce, gave the jury more than sufficient evidence to conclude rationally that there was a reasonable probability that McCormack's criminal activity, if successful, would have had a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.

B. McCormack's Sentence

McCormack also challenges the 188-month sentence he received, which he says violates the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to "provid[e] certainty and fairness in sentencing and reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities." 28 U.S.C. § 994(f). McCormack admits that he did not raise this issue in front of the district court, and so our review is only for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-36 (1993). Under the plain error test, McCormack bears the burden of demonstrating "(1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights (i.e., the error was not harmless), and

(4) that seriously undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Fazal-Ur-Raheman-Fazal, 355 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 2004); see United States v. Geronimo, 330 F.3d 67, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2003) (burden is on the defendant).

McCormack's argument is that his sentence is longer than it would have been if the jury had convicted, rather than acquitted, him of the firearm charge. The reason, claims McCormack, is that the district court increased his base offense level by seven for his Hobbs Act offenses because a firearm was discharged in the course of the kidnapping.[3] U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3). As a result of this seven-level enhancement (which McCormack admits was applicable on its face), McCormack's total offense level increased from 28 to 35,[4] which, given his Criminal History Category of II, raised the applicable sentencing range from 87-108 months to 188-235

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[3]This enhancement was permissible even though McCormack was acquitted of the firearm offense. There are differences in both the standard of liability and the government's burden of proof between the § 924(c) offense and the sentencing enhancements for possession or use of a firearm. The crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was, actually or constructively, carried or used in a crime of violence. See United States v. Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 509-10 (1st Cir. 2003). The sentencing enhancements relating to firearms, by contrast, require only proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the relevant conduct. See United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1997). Even if the conduct involved is the same, acquitted conduct may be used for sentencing. Id.

[4]The base offense level under the Guidelines is 18, but McCormack also received several other enhancements, which are not challenged on appeal, that increased his offense level to 28. These included a two-level enhancement because the offense involved the express or implied threat of death, § 2B3.2(b)(1); a two-level enhancement because the amount demanded was more than $50,000 but less than $250,000, § 2B3.1(b)(7); a two-level enhancement due to the victim's bodily injury, § 2B3.2(b)(4)(A); and a four-level increase because a person was abducted to facilitate the offense, § 2B3.2(b)(5).

months, see id. ch. 5 pt. A. The judge sentenced McCormack at the low end of this range, imposing a 188-month sentence.

But if the jury had convicted him of the firearm charge pursuant to § 924(c), McCormack argues, then the Sentencing Guidelines would have directed the judge not to apply the firearm enhancement. See id. § 2K2.4 cmt. 4. Although the § 924(c) conviction would have added 60 months to his sentence,[5] see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), this would have resulted in a sentencing range of only 147-168 months, which, even if the judge imposed the maximum, is still 20 months shorter than the 188-month sentence he received.

As McCormack admits, the Sentencing Guidelines anticipate this anomaly. To avoid the possibility of inconsistent sentences, the application notes to the provision dealing with violations of § 924(c), provide, in relevant part, that:

> In a few cases in which the defendant is determined not to be a career offender, the offense level for the underlying offense . . . may result in a guideline range that, when combined with the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. . . . § 924(c). . . , produces a total maximum penalty that is less than the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under 18 U.S.C. . . . § 924(c) . . . (i.e., the guideline range that would have resulted if the enhancements for possession, use, or discharge of a firearm had been applied). In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted so that [a] conviction under . . . § 924(c) . . . does not result in a decrease in the total punishment. An upward departure under this paragraph shall not exceed the maximum of

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[5]The statute was amended in 1998 to provide for a ten-year sentence when a firearm is discharged. Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a), 112 Stat. 3496, 3496 (Nov. 13, 1998). At the time of the offense, however, the statute provided for only a five-year sentence.

> the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under 18 U.S.C. . . . § 924(c). . . .

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). See generally United States v. Hickey, 280 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2002). Several courts have affirmed such upward departures. See, e.g., United States v. Banks-Giombetti, 245 F.3d 949, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 465-66 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d 1295, 1310-11 (7th Cir. 1995). The government reasons that because of this provision it is not likely that McCormack would have received a lesser sentence had he been convicted of the § 924(c) charge.

McCormack contends that this solution is insufficient to meet the statutory mandate of avoiding unwarranted disparities in sentences because the district court retains discretion not to depart upward when a § 924(c) conviction has the effect of reducing a defendant's sentence. McCormack says that the result of this discretion is that it is preferable in certain circumstances, from the defendant's point of view, to be convicted under § 924(c). The sentencing range in such cases can be no higher than if the defendant were acquitted, see § 2K2.4 cmt. 4, and there is at least the possibility of convincing a sympathetic judge not to depart upward. Because of this potential, McCormack argues that the Guidelines are inconsistent with the statutory command in 28 U.S.C. § 994(f).

We are doubtful that the mere potential for a disparity in sentences is enough to put the Guidelines and statute into conflict, especially given the application note. The existence of a potential disparity is nonetheless a very good reason for defense counsel to present the issue to the sentencing judge. That was not done here. We cannot say that there was plain error because McCormack cannot show that his "substantial rights" were affected. Fazal-Ur-Raheman-Fazal, 355 F.3d at 48. There is no reason to assume that if McCormack had been

convicted of the firearm offense in § 924(c) then he would have been sentenced according to the 147-168 month range that he calculates. The district court may well have departed upward, as encouraged by the Guidelines. In fact, the district court could have departed upward beyond the 188-month sentence that McCormack received, up to 235 months, the maximum of the Guidelines range that McCormack faced. See § 2K2.4 cmt. 4. McCormack's acquittal on the § 924(c) count may well have been what influenced the judge to sentence at the low end of the available range. We add that the use of firearms during the kidnapping was a very serious matter, and the judge was well within his authority in giving the sentence that he did.

III.

McCormack's conviction and sentence are **affirmed**.

APPENDIX B

U.S. Const., Amend. V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U. S. Const. Amend. VI:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1):

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm

muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to life imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried.

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act):

Interference with commerce by threats or violence

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section--

(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.

(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.

(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.

(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52, 101-115, 151-166 of Title 29 or sections 151-188 of Title 45.

28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B):

The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices . . .

28 U.S.C. § 994(f):

The Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to subsection (a)(1), shall promote the purposes set forth in section 991(b)(1), with particular attention to the requirements of subsection 991(b)(1)(B) for providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.

United States Sentencing Guideline § 2B3.2

EXTORTION BY FORCE OR THREAT OF INJURY OR SERIOUS DAMAGE

(a) Base Offense Level: 18

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics

(1) If the offense involved an express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, increase by 2 levels.

(2) If the greater of the amount demanded or the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, increase by the corresponding number of levels from the table in § 2B3.1(b)(7).

(3) (A)(I) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (ii) if a firearm was otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (iii) if a firearm was brandished or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (iv) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; or (v) if a dangerous weapon was brandished or possessed, increase by 3 levels; or

(B) If (I) the offense involved preparation to carry out a threat of (I) death; (II) serious bodily injury; (III) kidnapping; (IV) product tampering; or (V) damage to a computer system used to maintain or operate a critical infrastructure, or by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security; or (ii) the participant(s) otherwise demonstrated the ability to carry out a threat described in any of subdivisions (i)(I) through (i)(V), increase by 3 levels.

(4) If any victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the seriousness of the injury:

Degree of Bodily Injury	Increase in Level
(A) Bodily Injury	add 2
(B) Serious Bodily Injury	add 4
(C) Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury	add 6

(D) If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisi ons (A) and (B), add 3 levels; or

(E) If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisi ons (B) and (C), add 5 levels.

Provided, however, that the cumulative adjustments from (3) and (4) shall not exceed 11 levels.

(5) (A) If any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 4 levels; or (B) if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels.

(c) Cross References

(1) If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. s 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply s2A1.1 (First Degree Murder).

(2) If the offense was tantamount to attempted murder, apply s2A2.1 (Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder) if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.4

USE OF FIREARM, ARMOR-PIERCING AMMUNITION, OR EXPLOSIVE DURING OR IN RELATION TO CERTAIN CRIMES

(a) If the defendant, whether or not convicted of another crime, was convicted of violating section 844(h) of title 18, United States Code, the guideline sentence is the term of imprisonment required by statute. Chapters Three (Adjustments) and Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) shall not apply to that count of conviction.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the defendant, whether or not convicted of another crime, was convicted of violating section 924(c) or section 929(a) of title 18, United

States Code, the guideline sentence is the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute. Chapters Three and Four shall not apply to that count of conviction.

(c) If the defendant (1) was convicted of violating section 924(c) or section 929(a) of title 18, United States Code; and (2) as a result of that conviction (alone or in addition to another offense of conviction), is determined to be a career offender under s4B1.1 (Career Offender), the guideline sentence shall be determined under s4B1.1(c). Except for ss3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility), 4B1.1, and 4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1), Chapters Three and Four shall not apply to that count of conviction.

(d) Special Instructions for Fines

(1) Where there is a federal conviction for the underlying offense, the fine guideline shall be the fine guideline that would have been applicable had there only been a conviction for the underlying offense. This guideline shall be used as a consolidated fine guideline for both the underlying offense and the conviction underlying this section.